IKEv1 vs IKEv2
- Design of IPsec and IKE version 1 and 2
- IKEv1 and IKEv2: A Quantitative Analyses
- IKE/ISAKMP considered harmful (IKEv1)
- Analysis of the IPSec Key Exchange Standard (IKEv1)
- AH is unnecessary
- the power of IPSec cannot be exploited until the API is changed to inform the application of the endpoint identifier, and the application is modified to use the information in the modified API.
- IKE is far too complex, and the specifications are so difficult to understand that it has not gotten a thorough review
- IKE’s second phase should be removed.
- The public encryption key variants of IKE should be removed.
- Modify IKE to allow stateless cookies
- RFC 2408, Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), Section 2.5.3 Anti-Clogging Token (”Cookie”) Creation
ISAKMP requires that the cookie be unique for each SA
establishment to help prevent replay attacks, therefore, the date and
time MUST be added to the information hashed.==> no stateless cookies in IKEv1
- IKEv2 Wikipedia